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ABSTRACT
In a one sector growth model with pollution in the utility function, the competitive
equilibrium can be indeterminate for plausible values of the intertemporal substitution
elasticity of consumption and under constant returns to scale. The tax rate on pollution
does not enter the condition characterizing indeterminacy. This means that the
government is not able to control emissions in the economy by using environmental
policies. Non-separability between private consumption and pollution in the utility
function is crucial for this result.
RESUMEN
En un modelo de crecimiento de un sector, con contaminación en la función de utilidad,
el equilibrio competitivo puede estar indeterminado para valores plausibles de la
elasticidad de sustitución intertemporal del consumo y bajo rendimientos constantes a
escala. El tipo impositivo sobre la contaminación no entra en la condición que
caracteriza las situaciones de indeterminación. Esto significa que el gobierno no es
capaz de controlar las emisiones contaminantes en la economía mediante el uso de
políticas medioambientales. La no-separabilidad entre el consumo privado y la
contaminación en la función de utilidad es crucial para este resultado.
The authors would like to thank professor Alfonso Novales for helpful comments and
financial support from Fundación Ramón Areces and Fundación CentrA.
Address for correspondence: Jesús Ruiz Andújar. Dpto. Fundamentos Análisis
Económico II. Facultad CCEE. UCM. 28223 Campus de Somosaguas. Madrid. Tfno. 34
91 394 23 52. E-mail: jruizand@ccee.ucm.es
1 Introduction
We characterize conditions on preferences under which competitive equilibrium can be in-
determinate in a single sector growth model with pollution in the utility function, constant
returns to scale in production and environmental taxes.
General equilibrium models that display indeterminacy have been focus of attention
in recent years. Indeterminacy implies that there will be multiple paths converging to a
given steady state. Hence, indeterminacy guarantees existence of a continuum of sunspot
stationary equilibria, i.e., stochastic rational expectations equilibria determined by per-
turbations unrelated to the uncertainty in economic fundamentals. The interest of sunspot
equilibria is that they provide a theoretical justification for ’animal spirits’ underlying eco-
nomic instability. In our model, the indeterminacy is able to explain why two economies
that share the same preferences, technology and initial capital stock might display differ-
ent pollution paths regardless of the implemented policies.
Characteristics that produce indeterminacy of equilibria in one- or multi-sector real
business cycle models or in endogenous growth models have been widely studied. Initially,
it was shown that when these models are extended to include either productivity exter-
nalities or some market imperfection, indeterminacy can arise if social returns to scale
in production are sufficiently high so that the labor demand curve has a slope which is
not only positive, but also greater than that of the labor supply curve (see Benhabib and
Farmer (1994), and Farmer and Guo (1994), for one-sector models). These models have
been widely criticized because to produce multiple equilibria they require larger returns
to scale than observed in actual data [see Aiyagari (1995)]. However, Ferna´ndez, Novales
and Ruiz (2003) obtain multiple equilibria under constant returns to scale and endogenous
government expenditures included in the utility function.
The contribution of our work is to show that indeterminacy could be present in a sim-
ple neoclassical growth model with a single source of externality: pollution entering in the
utility function in a non-separable fashion with private consumption. We assume a gov-
ernment whose public expenditures are financed through distorting taxes (a proportional
tax on income and an environmental tax), and its budget balances every period. Our
economy can display indeterminacy for plausible values of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of consumption and constant returns to scale. Furthermore, the region of the
parameter space producing indeterminacy is independent of the income and pollution tax
rates. The implication of this result is crucial for government environmental policies: the
government is not able to control pollution level by using an appropiate environmental
policy (for example, by implementing the pigouvian pollution tax rate).
The model is described in section 2. In section 3 we characterize the transitional
dynamics of the model and the conditions for indeterminacy. In section 4 we show why
environmental fiscal policies might be ineffective to control pollution level. The paper
closes with some remarks in section 4.
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2 The Economy
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of identical firms operating in a competitive environment. For
simplicity, we normalize their number to one. Aggregate production exhibits constant
returns to scale:1
y = Akαn 1−α, α ∈ (0, 1) , (1)
y being aggregate output and k, n the demand for the two production factors: capital
and labor. Environmental pollution (P ) is regarded as a side product of the capital stock
use:
P = kχ, with χ > 0. (2)
To simplify we assume that P
t
is a flow quantity. Firms rent capital from households
at the interest rate r, pay wage ω on labor and pay a constant pollution tax τ
P
on the
level of capital stock. The single period profit function is π = y − ωn− rk − τ
P
k.
Under perfectly competitive markets for the two factors, profit maximizing conditions
are:
r = α
y
k
− τ
P
, (3)
ω = (1− α)
y
n
. (4)
2.2 The Consumer’s Problem
There is a continuum of identical consumers, all of them with the same preferences de-
fined on private consumption, pollution and leisure, according to the instantaneous utility
function:
U(c, P, n) =
(cP−η)1−σ
1− σ
− γn , with γ, σ > 0, σ = 1 , (5)
where c is private consumption, P aggregate pollution, and n labor supply2. σ is the
inverse of intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption, η the weight of pollution
in utility and γ the marginal disutility of work.
1
For ease of notation, the time dependence of all variables is suppressed.
2
This function arises from including the assumption of employment indivisibility (Hansen(1985)) into
the standard utility function used in the literature studying the relationship between growth and pollution.
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Each consumer receives income on labor and capital, that can be used to consume,
save, and pay taxes at a constant rate τ ∈ (0, 1) on the two sources of income:
c+ k˙ + δk = (1− τ) (ωn + rk) . (6)
Hence, the representative consumer faces the optimization problem:
Max
{c,n}
∫
∞
0
e−ρtU(c, P, n) dt (7)
subject to (6) and given k
0
where ρ is the rate of pure time preference. The household
ignores the environmental utility externality.
First order conditions for this problem are given by:
c−σP−η(1−σ) = λ , (8)
γ = λ(1− τ )ω , (9)
−
λ˙
λ
= (1− τ )r − (δ + ρ) , (10)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ = 0 , (11)
λ being the multiplier associated to the consumer’s budget constraint.
Combining (8) and (9) and using (2):
γ = c−σk−χη(1−σ)(1− τ )ω. (12)
Combining (8) and (10) and using (2):
σ
c˙
c
+ χη (1− σ)
k˙
k
= (1− τ)r − (δ + ρ). (13)
2.3 Government
The government chooses an income tax rate τ and an environmental tax τ
P
and balances
its budget every period. Hence, the instantaneous government budget constraint is:
g = τ (ωn+ rk) + τ
P
k, (14)
where g represents government spending on goods and services which are not an ar-
gument of the utility or the production functions.
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2.4 Equilibrium
Given τ , τ
P
and k
0
, a competitive equilibrium is a set of trajectories {c, n, k, P, g, ω, r}
such that: i) given the paths for {ω, r, P}, the paths for {c, n, k} solve consumer’s problem
[(6), (8), (11), (12), (13)]; ii) given {ω, r}, the paths for {n, k} solve the firm’s problem
[(3) and (4)]; iii) government budget constraint (14) holds every period, and iv) markets
clear, in particular, from (6), (1) and (14) we obtain the aggregate resources constraint
Akαn1−α = c+
(
k˙ + δk
)
+ g , (15)
where (substituing (3) and (4) in (14)) g is
g = τAkαn1−α + τ
P
(1− τ) k. (16)
3 Local Dynamics
Let us now discuss the local properties of the equilibrium dynamics of the system.
Definition: A steady state is a vector (c
ss
, k
ss
, n
ss
, λ
ss
, P
ss
) satisfying the equations
for competitive equilibrium such that if it is ever reached, the system will stay at that
point forever (c˙
ss
= k˙
ss
= λ˙
ss
= 0):
k
ss
n
ss
=
[
(1− τ )Aα
δ + ρ+ τ
P
(1− τ)
] 1
1−α
, (17)
c
ss
k
ss
=
[δ + τ
P
(1− τ )] (1− α) + ρ
α
, (18)
n
ss
=
[
(1− τ )A (1− α)
γ
] 1
σ+χη(1−σ)
(
k
ss
n
ss
) α
σ+χη(1−σ)
−1
(
c
ss
k
ss
)
−
σ
σ+χη(1−σ)
, (19)
P
ss
= kχ
ss
, (20)
λ
ss
= c−σ
ss
k−χη(1−σ)
ss
, (21)
where (17) comes from (10), (1) and (3); (18) refers to (15)-(17); (19) comes from (12)
together with (1), (4), (17) and (18); (20) comes from (2), and (21) is obtained from (8)
and (2). All these equations are evaluated at the steady-state.
To characterize the local dynamics of the system it is enough to analyze the transition
of the state and co-state variables (k, λ). That requires to write the control variables (c,
n) as a function of (k, λ).
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n =
[
(1− α) (1− τ )A
γ
λ
] 1
α
k, (22)
c = λ−
1
σ − k−
χη(1−σ)
σ (23)
where (22) comes from (9), (1) and (4); and (23) is obtained from (8) together with
(2).
The first order approximation to the dynamic system made up by equations (10) and
(15) is:
[
k˙
λ˙
]
= Γ
[
k − k
ss
λ− λ
ss
]
,
with transition matrix Γ (see Appendix):
Γ =
[
φ
1
(
k
ss
λ
ss
)[
(1−α)(δ+ρ+τ
P
(1−τ))
α
2
+ (1−α)(δ+τP (1−τ))+ρ
σα
]
0 φ
2
]
, (24)
where φ
1
= [σ + χη (1− σ)] (1−α)[δ+τP (1−τ)]+ρ
σα
and φ
2
= − (1−α)[δ+ρ+τP (1−τ)]
α
< 0.
Since one of the variables in the system is predetermined and the other is free, the
system will have a unique, locally determined equilibrium when the steady state is a
saddle point, which requires the two characteristic roots of matrix Γ to be of opposite
sign. Indeterminacy of equilibria arises only when the two roots of Γ have negative real
parts.
Proposition 1 Indeterminacy results if and only if σ + χη (1− σ) < 0.
Proof. Since matrix Γ is triangular, φ
1
and φ
2
are the two eigenvalues. φ
2
is always
negative and φ
1
is negative when σ + χη (1− σ) < 0. Therefore, indeterminacy arises
when this condition is satisfied.
From proposition 1, note that σ > 1 is a necessary condition for indeterminacy. Fur-
thermore, indeterminacy only arises in economies with χη > σ
σ−1
> 1. That is, economies
where the weight of pollution in the utility function is high (η) and/or economies where
the elasticity of pollution with respect to capital is high (χ). Consider two economies that
share the same environmental preference (η) but one of them with a dirtier technology
than the other (larger χ). The economy with a larger χ (this is more often the case
for developing countries) will experience indeterminacy of equilibria more likely than the
other.
Corollary 2 Indeterminacy can arise for any value of the income and pollution tax rates
and hence, for any level of government expenditure.
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Proof. Note that in this economy fiscal policy parameters do not affect the condition
guaranteeing indeterminacy of equilibria.
Hence, if the structural (preferences and technology) parameters place the economy
inside the indeterminacy region, public policies will not be able to move the economy
towards the determinacy region and achieve its stabilization. That is, the model could
display stationary sunspot equilibria in which there exist fluctuations in employment,
consumption, pollution, and so on, despite the absence of fluctuations in the fundamental
features of the economy.
Corollary 3 Indeterminacy can also arise for the pigouvian pollution tax (the pollution
tax rate that removes the externality).
Proof. It is obvious from corollary 2, since the pigouvian pollution tax rate is a
particular case of the fiscal policy.
Therefore, indeterminacy can also arise for the planner problem.
The model studied is a particular case of an economy with non-separable preferences
in pollution and effort. Proposition 4 bellow shows that indeterminacy can also arise in
this more general model. Let W (c, P, n) = (cP
−η
)
1−σ
1−σ
− γ
1+ψ
(
P φn
)
1+ψ
, σ > 0, σ = 1,
η > 0, ψ ≥ 0. The sign of φ would be negative in an economy in which pollution reduces
the marginal utility of time employed out of work (for example, because of polluted leisure
areas), and hence, lowers the marginal disutility of effort; on the contrary, it would be
positive for an economy in which pollution worsens the conditions at work and hence
increases the marginal disutility of effort (for example, by increasing health costs).
In this model, the labor supply is (in log form):
lnw = ln
(
γ
1− τ
)
+ [φ (1 + ψ) + η (1− σ)] lnP + σ ln c+ ψ lnn,
where ψ is the labor supply curve slope.
Assuming σ > 1, note that, if φ < 0 the labor supply curve shifts to the right when
the pollution level increases. That is, the labor supply is larger for a given wage. On the
contrary, if φ > 0 the labor supply curve could shift to the left (if [φ (1 + ψ) + η (1− σ)] <
0) after a rise in the pollution level. Hence, the labor supply is lower for a given wage.
Proposition 4: If preferences of the representative agent in the economy are repre-
sented by the utility function W (c, P, n), the competitive equilibrium is indeterminate if
and only if
ρ
(
σ + χη (1− σ)
σ
)
+
Ω χ
ασ (ψ + α)
[η (1− σ) (ψ + α)− σφ (1 + ψ)] < 0,
and
−Ξ
Ω
ψ + α
[
ρ
σ
+
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ ) + ρ)
ασ
]
> 0,
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where
Ω = (1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ) + ρ) ,
Ξ = (σ + χη(1− σ) + ψ + χφ(1 + ψ)) .
Corollary 5: If preferences of the representative agent are represented by the utility
function W (c, P, n) and φ > 0, the competitive equilibrium is indeterminate if and only
if σ + χη(1− σ) + ψ + χφ(1 + ψ) < 0.
Proof : See appendix.  
From corollary 5, note that σ > 1 is also a necessary condition for indeterminacy when
φ > 0. Furthermore, the higher φ and ψ, the narrower the parameter space for which
equilibrium is indeterminate, because higher values for χ and η are required.
Corollary 6: If φ > 0, non-separability of private consumption and pollution in the
utility function (η > 0) is crucial for the competitive equilibrium to be indeterminate.
Proof : Assume that η = 0 in utility function W (c, P, n). There is no point in the
parameter space for which equilibrium is indeterminate since σ+χη(1−σ)+ψ+χφ(1+ψ) <
0 is never satisfied if φ > 0. 
4 Indeterminacy, the labor market and pollution dy-
namics
4.1 Indeterminacy and the labor market
Most work discussing indeterminacy of equilibria in one sector models shows that it is
associated with upward sloping labor demand curves, downward sloping labor supply
curves, or both (see the survey in Benhabib and Farmer (1999)). In our model, the labor
demand schedule is downward sloping as a consequence of the constant returns to scale.
Two definitions of the labor supply curve have been used in previous literature: the
standard and the Frisch curve3. Several papers have proved that under externalities in
the utility function and/or non-separable preferences in private consumption and leisure,
the appropiate labor supply curve to understand why indeterminacy arises, is the Frisch
one (Ferna´ndez, Novales and Ruiz (2003) or Benett and Farmer (2000)). Since our model
includes an environmental externality in utility non-separable with consumption, we relate
our condicion for indetermination to the Frisch labor supply curve.
In our model, the Frisch labor supply curve is infinitely elastic under indeterminacy
and non-indeterminacy of equilibria. From (9), households works any time at the wage
given by:
ω =
γ
λ(1− τ )
.
3
The standard labor supply curve is the quantity of labor supplied as a function of the real wage,
holding constant consumption. The Frisch labor supply curve is the quantity of labor supplied as a
function of the real wages, holding constant the marginal utility of consumption. Browing (1982) and
Browing, Deaton and Irish (1985) introduce the definition of a Frisch demand.
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Hence, the appropiate condition for indeterminacy of equilibria to arise in an economy is
not related to the slope of the labor supply curve.
From (8) together with (2) it is obtained that, under indeterminacy (that is, when σ+
χη (1− σ) < 0), the marginal utility of consumption (λ) increases when both consumption
and capital stock increases. Therefore, the Frisch labor supply curve shifts downwards.
On the contrary, when equilibrium is determinate the marginal utility of consumption
decreases as a consequence of an increase in both consumption and capital stock and the
Frisch labor supply curve shifts upwards. Therefore, the condition for indeterminacy of
the competitive equilibrium to arise in the economy that we consider is that the Frisch
labor supply curve shifts downwards when both consumption and capital stock increases.
The intuition behind the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria is as follows. If
agents expect future income tax rates will be above average, then future expected wage
net of taxes will be lower and hence, future hours worked will decrease (see (12)). As a
consequence, the expected rate of return on capital decreases, since the marginal product
of capital is increasing in the labor/capital ratio. The decrease in the expected interest
rate produces a decline in current private accumulation of capital stock. Then, future
hours worked and capital stock will be lower and hence, future output and consumption
level will also be lower.
Only when indeterminacy is present (i.e. σ + χη (1− σ) < 0), the decrease in future
consumption and capital stock will yield a new upward shift in the Frisch labor supply
curve, and hours worked in equilibrium will positively be lower. Since future capital stock
and hours worked are lower, future aggregate income will also be below-average and, given
an income tax rate, future government revenues would decrease. As a consequence, given
a public spending, the only feasible behaviour for government is to rise the income tax
rate in order to satisfy its budget constraint. Thus, private expectations of above-average
future income tax rates lead to higher future income tax rates, regardless the government
wishes.
4.2 Indeterminacy and pollution dynamics
Now we show that in an economy where indeterminacy of equilibria is present, the govern-
ment can not control the pollution regardless the policy implemented by the government.
Proposition 7 When σ + χη (1− σ) < 0, starting from an initial capital stock k
0
,
the economy has a continuun of equilibria, indexed by n
0
.
Proof: Note that transition matrix Γ is triangular (24). Furthermore, under σ +
χη (1− σ) < 0, both eigenvalues φ
1
and φ
2
are negative. Therefore, the local solution is:
λ = λ
ss
+ eφ2t (λ
0
− λ
ss
) , (25)
k = k
ss
+ (k
0
− k
ss
) eφ1t +
φ
1
φ
2
− φ
1
(
eφ2t − eφ1t
)
(λ
0
− λ
ss
) , (26)
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and from (22):
λ
0
=
γ
(1− α) (1− τ )A
nσ
0
1
k
0
. (27)
Therefore, an initial value of labor determinates the path of capital stock and the path
of the marginal utility of consumption. From (2), (22) and (23), an initial value of labor
also determinates the path of pollution, labor and consumption.  
Corollary 8: If σ + χη (1− σ) < 0, k
0
= k
ss
and n
0
< n
ss
, then:
1) k
t
> k
ss
, for all t > 0, and
2) P
t
> P
ss
, for all t > 0,
while if n
0
> n
ss
, opposite results are found.
Proof: Imposing n
0
< n
ss
in (27), we obtain that λ
0
< λ
ss
. Since k
0
= k
ss
, (26) can
be written as:
k
t
= k
ss
+
φ
1
φ
2
− φ
1
(
eφ2t − eφ1t
)
(λ
0
− λ
ss
) , ∀t > 0. (28)
Assume that φ
2
> φ
1
and φ
1
< 0, then φ1
φ
2
−φ
1
< 0 and eφ2t > eφ1t. These facts together
with λ
0
< λ
ss
imply that k
t
> k
ss
, ∀t > 0. From (2), since k
0
= k
ss
, then P
0
= P
ss
and
k
t
> k
ss
imply that P
t
> P
ss
, ∀t > 0. When φ
2
< φ
1
the same results are obtained.
When n
0
> n
ss
an analogous proof is appliable. 
Assume two economies which share the same fiscal policy, technology and preferences
and both of which are in the steady-state. Assume also these economies are placed on the
indeterminacy region of the parameter space and, in any moment of time, the agents have
different expectations about future, yielding different equilibrium labor at the present in
both economies. In particular, assume that in one case labor is above its steady-state value
while in the other economy, labor is below its steady-state value. Corollary 8 has shown
that economies 1 and 2 will display different paths of capital and pollution while they are
converging back to the steady-state (see figure 1). Since the choice of initial labor does
not depend on the implemented policy by the government at the present, the convergence
path of pollution will not depend on the implemented income or environmental tax rates.
Therefore, the government can not do anything to control the pollution in this economy
since the pollution path depends, not only on the tax rates, but also on the initial level of
labor supply (n
0
). Proposition 9 bellow shows that this fact does not happen when there
is not indeterminacy of equilibria.
Proposition 9: When σ + χη (1− σ) > 0, government can control the pollution in
this economy through a environmental tax since the pollution path does not depend on n
0
.
Proof: Transition matrix Γ is triangular (24). Furthermore, under σ+χη (1− σ) > 0,
the eigenvalue φ
1
is positive while φ
2
is negative (saddle-path equilibrium). Therefore,
the local solution is (25), together with:
k = k
ss
+ (k
0
− k
ss
) eφ2t,
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and λ
0
can take only the value:
λ
0
= λ
ss
+
φ
2
− φ
1
φ
1
(k
0
− k
ss
) .
Since φ
2
= − (1−α)[δ+ρ+τP (1−τ)]
α
, the path of the capital stock depends on both the income
tax rate and the pollution tax. Pollution is a function increasing in capital stock (2); so,
the government can control the path of pollution through taxes.  
5 Conclusions
For a class of utility functions characterized by non-separability between pollution and
consumption, we have shown that the competitive equilibrium can be indeterminate for
plausible values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, under government expen-
ditures financed through a fixed income and pollution tax rates, and constant returns
to scale in production. The region in the parameter space leading to indeterminacy is
characterized by:
i) The tax rates on income and pollution do not enter the condition characterizing
indeterminacy. This means that the government cannot control emissions in the economy
only by using environmental policies.
ii) Indeterminacy only can arise in economies where the weight of pollution in the
utility function is high (η) and/or economies where the elasticity of pollution respect to
capital is high (χ).
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Appendix
Part1: Deriving the elements of Γ :
From (15) and (16) we get:
k˙ = (1− τ )Akαn(k, λ)1−α − (δ + τ
P
(1− τ)) k − c(k, λ). (29)
where c (k, λ) is given by (23) and n (k, λ) is given by (22), while from (10), (1) and
(3) we get:
λ˙ = −λ
[
(1− τ)αAkα−1n (k, λ)1−α − (δ + ρ+ τ
P
(1− τ))
]
. (30)
The dynamics of system (29)-(30) in (k, λ) around steady state can be characterized
through the linear approximation:
[
k˙
λ˙
]
=
[
Γ
11
Γ
12
Γ
21
Γ
22
] [
k − k
ss
λ− λ
ss
]
, (31)
with:
Γ
11
= (1− τ )Aα
(
k
ss
n
ss
)
α−1
− (δ + τ
P
(1− τ)) + (1− τ )(1− α)A
(
k
ss
n
ss
)
α
∂n
∂k
|
ss
−
∂c
∂k
|
ss
(32)
Γ
12
= (1− τ)(1− α)A
(
k
ss
n
ss
)
α
∂n
∂λ
|
ss
−
∂c
∂λ
|
ss
, (33)
Γ
21
= −λ
ss
(1− τ)αA
[
(α− 1) kα−2
ss
n1−α
ss
+ (1− α) kα−1
ss
n−α
ss
∂n
∂k
|
ss
]
, (34)
Γ
22
= −λ
ss
(1− τ )αA (1− α) kα−1
ss
n−α
ss
∂n
∂λ
|
ss
, (35)
with ∂x
∂z
|
ss
, x = n, c and z = k, λ, denoting partial derivatives, evaluated at steady
state.
From (22) and (23), and using (16), (17) and (21), the partial derivatives in (32)-(35)
are:
∂n
∂λ
|
ss
=
1
α
n
ss
λ
ss
,
∂c
∂λ
|
ss
= −
1
σ
c
ss
λ
ss
,
∂n
∂k
|
ss
=
n
ss
k
ss
,
∂c
∂k
|
ss
= −
χη (1− σ)
σ
c
ss
k
ss
.
14
Using (17) to eliminate
(
k
ss
n
ss
)
α−1
= δ+ρ+τP (1−τ)
(1−τ)Aα
, together with these expressions and
(18) yields:
Γ
11
= ρ + (1− α)
δ + ρ+ τ
P
(1− τ)
α
+
χη (1− σ)
σ
[δ + τ
P
(1− τ )] (1− α) + ρ
α
(36)
= [σ + χη (1− σ)]
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ )) + ρ
σα
Γ
12
=
k
ss
λ
ss
[
(1− τ)(1− α)A
(
k
ss
n
ss
)
α−1
1
α
+
1
σ
[δ + τ
P
(1− τ)] (1− α) + ρ
α
]
=
=
k
ss
λ
ss
[
(1− α)
δ + ρ+ τ
P
(1− τ)
α2
+
[δ + τ
P
(1− τ)] (1− α) + ρ
σα
]
(37)
Γ
21
= −λ
ss
(1− τ )αA
[
(α− 1) kα−2
ss
n1−α
ss
+ (1− α) kα−2
ss
n1−α
ss
]
= 0, (38)
Γ
22
= −(1− τ )αA (1− α) kα−1
ss
n1−α
ss
1
α
= −
(1− α) [δ + ρ+ τ
P
(1− τ)]
α
. (39)
Proof of proposition 4:
For utility function W (c, g, n), the control variables (c, n), as functions of (k, λ) are
given by (23) and:
n =
[
(1− α) (1− τ )A
γ
λk
α−χφ(1+ψ)
] 1
ψ+α
,
which is analogue of (22), with partial derivatives:
∂n
∂k
|
ss
=
α− χφ (1 + ψ)
ψ + α
n
ss
k
ss
,
∂n
∂λ
|
ss
=
1
ψ + α
n
ss
λ
ss
,
and, again,
(
k
ss
n
ss
)
α−1
= δ+ρ+τP (1−τ)
(1−τ)Aα
, so that (36)-(39) become:
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Γ
11
= ρ +
χη (1− σ)
ασ
[(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ)) + ρ] +
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ) + ρ) (α− χφ (1 + ψ))
α (ψ + α)
,
Γ
12
=
[
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ ) + ρ)
α (ψ + α)
+
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ)) + ρ
ασ
]
k
ss
λ
ss
Γ
21
=
[
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ ) + ρ) (ψ + χφ (1 + ψ))
ψ + α
]
λ
ss
k
ss
,
Γ
22
= −
(1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ ) + ρ)
ψ + α
.
Indeterminacy of equilibria arises only when the two roots of Γ are negative. This
means that trace of Γ be negative, and its determinant be positive. That is
Tr(Γ) = Γ
11
+ Γ
22
= ρ
(
σ+χη(1−σ)
σ
)
+ Ω χ
ασ(ψ+α)
[η (1− σ) (ψ + α)− σφ (1 + ψ)] < 0,
and
Det(Γ) = −Ξ Ω
ψ+α
[
ρ
σ
+ (1−α)(δ+τP (1−τ)+ρ)
ασ
]
> 0,
where
Ω = (1− α) (δ + τ
P
(1− τ) + ρ) ,
Ξ = (σ + χη(1− σ) + ψ + χφ(1 + ψ)) .
 
Proof of corollary 5: If φ > 0 then Tr(Γ) < 0 only if σ > 1 and σ+χη (1− σ) < 0,
and Det(Γ) > 0 if and only if σ+ χη(1− σ) +ψ+ χφ(1 +ψ) < 0. When σ+ χη(1− σ) +
ψ+χφ(1+ψ) < 0, then the condition for the trace (σ+χη (1− σ) < 0) is also satisfied. 
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